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ABSTRACT
This article contributes to public and policy debates on the value of
social media disruption activity with respect to terrorist material. In
particular, it explores aggressive account and content takedown,
with the aim of accurately measuring this activity and its impacts.
The major emphasis of the analysis is the so-called Islamic State (IS)
and disruption of their online activity, but a catchall “Other Jihadi”
category is also utilized for comparison purposes. Our findings chal-
lenge the notion that Twitter remains a conducive space for pro-IS
accounts and communities to flourish. However, not all jihadists on
Twitter are subject to the same high levels of disruption as IS, and
we show that there is differential disruption taking place. IS’s and
other jihadists’ online activity was never solely restricted to Twitter; it
is just one node in a wider jihadist social media ecology. This is
described and some preliminary analysis of disruption trends in this
area supplied too.
In the aftermath of the London Bridge attack in June 2017, the British prime minister,
Theresa May, warned social media companies, including Twitter and Facebook, that
they must eradicate extremist “safe spaces.”1 She reiterated this in her speech to the
World Economic Forum at Davos in January 2018, stating “technology companies still
need to do more in stepping up to their responsibilities for dealing with harmful and
illegal online activity. Companies simply cannot stand by while their platforms are used
to facilitate … the spreading of terrorist and extremist content.”2 Prime Minister May’s
concerns about the use of the Internet, particularly social media, by violent extremists,
terrorists, and their supporters are shared by an assortment of others, including aca-
demics, policymakers, and publics. Much of this is due to apparent connections between
the consumption of, and networking around, violent extremist and terrorist online con-
tent and the internalization3 of extremist ideology (i.e., “(violent) online radicalization”);
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recruitment into violent extremist or terrorist groups or movements; and/or attack plan-
ning and preparation. Apparently easy access to large volumes of potentially influencing
violent extremist and terrorist content on prominent and heavily trafficked social media
platforms is a cause of particular anxiety. The micro-blogging platform, Twitter, has
been subject to particular scrutiny, especially regarding their response (or alleged lack of
same) to use of their platform by the so-called Islamic State (IS), also known as Daesh
or Da’ish.
Internet companies have responded both individually and collectively. On 26 June
2017, Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter, and YouTube jointly announced, via an agreed
text posted on each of their company’s official blogs, the establishment of the Global
Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT).4 They described the purpose of the
GIFCT as “help[ing] us continue to make our hosted consumer services hostile to ter-
rorists and violent extremists” and went on to state: “We believe that by working
together, sharing the best technological and operational elements of our individual
efforts, we can have a greater impact on the threat of terrorist content online.”5 In
terms of individual companies’ responses, in November 2017 Facebook published a
blog post in their “Hard Questions” series addressing the question “Are We Winning
the War on Terrorism Online?” Facebook announced in the post that it is able to
remove 99 percent of IS and Al Qaeda material prior to it being flagged by users
“primarily” due to advances in artificial intelligence techniques. Once Facebook
becomes aware of a piece of terrorist material, it removes 83 percent of “subsequently
uploaded copies” within an hour of their being uploaded, the company said.6 Missing
from the update however were figures on how much terrorist content (e.g., posts,
images, videos) is removed from Facebook on a daily, weekly, or monthly basis.
Twitter is much less reticent on this point.
According to the section “Combating Violent Extremism” in Twitter’s twelfth
Transparency Report, published in September 2017, in the period 1 January to 30
June 2017:
… a total of 299,649 accounts were suspended for violations related to promotion of
terrorism, which is down 20% from the volume shared in the previous reporting period.
Of those suspensions, 95% consisted of accounts flagged by internal, proprietary spam-
fighting tools, while 75% of those accounts were suspended before their first tweet.7
All told, Twitter claim to have suspended a total of 1,210,357 accounts for “violations
related to the promotion of terrorism” in the period from 1 August 2015 to 31
December 2017.8
A disparity therefore exists between the assertions of policymakers, on the one hand,
and major social media companies, on the other, as regards the levels and significance
of their disruption activity. Although Twitter claims severe disruption of IS is occurring
on their platform, detailed description and analysis of the precise nature of this disrup-
tion activity and, importantly, its effects are sparse,9 particularly within the academic lit-
erature. This article aims to contribute to public and policy debates on the value of
disruption activity, particularly aggressive account and content takedown, by seeking to
accurately measure this activity and its impacts. The research findings challenge the
notion that Twitter remains a conducive space for IS accounts and communities to
flourish, although IS continue, to some lesser extent, to distribute propaganda through
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the channel. Not all jihadists on Twitter are subject to the same high levels of disruption
as IS; however, this research demonstrates that a level of differential disruption is taking
place. Additionally, and critically, the online presence of IS and other jihadists is not
restricted to Twitter. The platform is merely one node in a wider jihadist online
ecology. The article describes and discusses this, and supplies some preliminary analysis
of disruption trends in this area too.
Social Media Monitoring
Methodology
To undertake the research, a semi-automated methodology for identifying pro-jihadist
accounts on Twitter was developed (see Figure 1) and implemented using the social
media analysis platform known as Method 52.10 In the first instance, a number of can-
didate accounts of interest were identified. The approach was grounded in finding
tweets that contained specific terms of interest (i.e., “seed search terms”), and/or the
identification of accounts that were, in some way, related to other accounts known to
be of interest (i.e., “seed accounts”) (see step (i) in Figure 1).
If a tweet matched these search criteria, it was automatically analyzed to determine if
it was relevant, using a machine-learning classifier trained to mimic the classification
decisions of a human analyst.11 A key task of the relevancy classifier was to separate tar-
get Twitter accounts from other Twitter accounts using similar language, such as those
held by journalists or researchers, for example. If the tweet was deemed as relevant, fur-
ther historic tweets were automatically extracted for the candidate account and assessed
for relevancy (see step (ii) in Figure 1), providing the system with an aggregate view of
the tweet history of the account. This overview of the tweet history was combined with
other account metadata that could be extracted. These pieces of information were
scored automatically and candidate Twitter accounts that exceeded the set thresholds
were presented to a human analyst for decision (see step (iii) in Figure 1). As portrayed
Figure 1. Detailed flow diagram for semi-automated social media analysis.
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in step (iv) in Figure 1, if one of the research analysts on the project confirmed that the
account was pro-jihadist, then the out-links contained in all of the account’s tweets
were automatically analyzed, and details of the account, its tweets, and its links were
stored in the database (see step (v) in Figure 1).
Information from new confirmed accounts was used by the system in a feedback loop
to continually improve its efficiency, thereby identifying new seed search terms (see step
(vi) in Figure 1) and providing additional seed accounts (see step (ii) in Figure 1).
Caveats
There were, however, a number of caveats attached to the data-collection that deserve
mention. First, the bulk of the data was gathered over two months in early 2017
(February to April). The system to implement the semi-automated methodology was
created, tested, and evolved throughout this period. The online accounts returned by
the system were integrated with those found via traditional, manual search for accounts
of interest. The overall approach was, therefore, a combination of automated and man-
ual, and snowball and purposive sampling methods.
Second, not all available data were captured. There were some periods of downtime for
the semi-automated system throughout this period as the methodology was developed
and modified. In addition, certain accounts found via automated means were unable to
be included due to them being taken down before the human analyst could assess and
confirm their affiliation,12 providing an early indication of the high levels of disruption
taking place. By the end of the research, when the system was working optimally, 100
percent of these accounts were identified by the software as pro-IS, again reflecting the
high level of disruption of IS-related accounts (discussed in further detail below).
Third, the semi-automated system primarily focused on pro-IS accounts operating in
English and Arabic (or some combination of these languages). There is, then, the possi-
bility that accounts tweeting primarily in, for example, Bahasa,13 Russian, or Turkish
were overlooked. This is worth noting, but probably negligible as the system’s effective-
ness improved as the research team learned more about pro-IS users’ Twitter activity
and refined the methodology accordingly. By early April 2017, for example, the software
was able to detect accounts directly distributing IS propaganda with very high precision,
regardless of what language was used. In addition, it is believed that the system also
identified the majority of accounts linking to that propaganda.
Data
The research dataset comprised 722 pro-IS accounts (labeled Pro-IS hereafter) and 451
other jihadist accounts (labeled “Other Jihadist” hereafter), with at least one follower14
active on Twitter at any point between 1 February and 7 April 2017 (see Table 1).
Accounts were determined to be Pro-IS if their avatar or carousel images contained
explicitly pro-IS imagery and/or text, and/or at least one recent tweet by the user (i.e.,
not a retweet) contained explicitly pro-IS images and/or text, such as referring to IS as
“Dawlah” or their fighters as “lions.” Accounts maintained by journalists, academics,
researchers, and others who tweeted, for example, Amaq News Agency content for
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informational purposes, were manually excluded. The Other Jihadist category included,
among others, those supportive of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Ahrar al-Sham, the
Taliban, and al-Shabaab. Similar parameters were employed to categorize these accounts.
Accounts in the research database were located and identified in three different ways
(see Table 2). The first set of accounts was manually identified by the research team,
principally by examining known jihadi accounts (or those known to be of interest to
jihadi supporters) and inspecting accounts within their networks (i.e., those following
or being followed by them). A second group of accounts was identified “semi-
automatically”—that is, automatically by the above-described social media monitoring
system and then manually inspected by a human analyst who confirmed: (a) whether or
not they were jihadist accounts; and (b), if they were, of what type. Several approaches
were used to identify or generate seed accounts. This included analyzing vocabulary
used in known jihadi accounts that were active during the time period studied or had
recently been active. This enabled the team to determine which terms were being used
much more often than would be expected statistically, and searching for tweets that
contained these terms. These candidates were then winnowed based on the relevancy of
their tweets in general (see above) and other metadata. Finally, a third set of accounts
was identified automatically by the social media monitoring system, based on the pres-
ence of known IS propaganda links (i.e., Uniform Resource Locators [URLs] linking to
official IS content hosted on some other platform or in some database on the Internet).
These links were first identified through other tracking procedures, including (but not
limited to) being spotted in confirmed IS tweets.
It is important to underline here that the Pro-IS account dataset is as close as pos-
sible—taking into account the caveats already made—to a full dataset of explicitly IS-
supportive accounts with at least one follower for the period studied. On the other
hand, the Other Jihadist dataset is a convenience sample of non-IS jihadist Twitter
accounts collected for comparison purposes and in no way reflects the actual number of
these accounts present on Twitter.
Measuring Disruption and Its Effects
Twitter was one of the most preferred online spaces for IS and their “fans,”15 even prior
to the establishment of their so-called caliphate in June 2014. It was estimated that there
Table 2. Location and identification of Twitter accounts.
Pro-IS Other jihadist
No. Percent No. Percent
Manually identified 193 27 332 74
Semi-automated 218 30 119 26
Advanced semi-automated 311 43 — —
Total 722 451
Table 1. Description of final dataset.
Pro-IS Other jihadist
Number of accounts 722 451
Number of tweets 57,574 62,156
Number of out-links 7,216 7,928
Percentage of tweets containing out-links 12.5 13
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were between 46,000 and 90,000 pro-IS Twitter accounts active in the period September
to December 2014.16 However, their activity was subject to disruption by Twitter from
mid-2014 and, although initially low level and sporadic, significantly increasing levels of
disruption were instituted throughout 2015 and 2016. From mid-2015 through January
2016, for example, Twitter claimed to have suspended in the region of 15,000 to 18,000
IS-supportive accounts per month. From mid-February to mid-July 2016, this increased
to an average of 40,000 IS-related account suspensions per month,17 according to the
company.18 Despite the growing costs attached to remaining on Twitter (such as greater
effort to maintain a public presence while relaying diffused messages and deflated mor-
ale), during this period IS supporters routinely penned online missives exhorting “Come
Back to Twitter.”19 The question raised here is whether, in 2017, it was any longer
worthwhile for pro-IS users to continue to seek to retain a presence on the platform?
Until now, the small amount of publicly available research on the online disruption
of IS has focused on the impact of Twitter’s suspension activities on follower numbers
for reestablished accounts.20 As well as updating these data, this research also examined
the longevity or survival time of accounts, and compared Pro-IS to Other Jihadist
accounts on both measures (i.e., follower numbers and longevity). The overall finding
was that IS-supportive accounts were being significantly disrupted, which in turn has
effectively eliminated IS’s once vibrant Twitter community. Differential disruption is
taking place, however, meaning Other Jihadist accounts were subject to much
less pressure.
Account Longevity
This section addresses the survival time of accounts in the research database. All were
active at the point they were identified and classified as Pro-IS or Other Jihadist. Once
an account was added to the database, its status was monitored and the system recorded
when it was suspended, if this subsequently occurred. This enabled the research team to
measure the age of each account (i.e., the time elapsed since the account’s creation) at
the date of suspension. Worth underlining here is that the below-described survival
rates of Pro-IS accounts would likely have been considerably shorter if the analysis
included those accounts suspended—often within minutes of creation—before they
could be captured by the research team for inclusion in the dataset.
Figure 2 depicts the estimated cumulative suspension rate for all Twitter accounts in
the dataset, outlining the probability of an account being suspended against its age (rep-
resented in days) for the 722 Pro-IS accounts and 451 Other Jihadist accounts. The
majority—around 65 percent—of Pro-IS accounts were suspended before they reached
70 days since inception. At the same time point, less than 20 percent of Other Jihadist
accounts had been suspended. In fact, in terms of differential disruption, more than 25
percent of Pro-IS accounts were suspended within five days of inception; a negligible
number (less than 1 percent) of Other Jihadist accounts were subject to the same
swift response.
The categorization of these accounts as jihadist in orientation was necessarily subject-
ive. It is possible that others may disagree with our decisions. To address this possibil-
ity, Figure 3 focuses on those accounts in the dataset that were eventually suspended:
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455 Pro-IS accounts and 163 Other Jihadist accounts. The rationale is that these
accounts were independently judged to have breached Twitter’s terms of service. Again,
regarding differential disruption, the data illustrates that 85 percent of Pro-IS accounts
were suspended within the first 60 days of their life, compared to 40 percent of accounts
falling into the Other Jihadist category. Further, more than 30 percent of Pro-IS
Figure 3. Cumulative suspension rate for accounts eventually suspended.
Figure 2. Cumulative suspension rate for all accounts in database.
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accounts were suspended within two days of their creation; less than 1 percent of Other
Jihadist accounts met the same fate.
Further analysis of suspended accounts revealed that the three subsets of Pro-IS
accounts (i.e., those identified manually, semi-automatically based on general tweet con-
tent, and advanced semi-automatically as a result of linking to official IS propaganda)
also displayed different survival and activity patterns. From the 722 Pro-IS accounts in
the dataset, the manually identified accounts (27 percent) survived disruption for longer
periods and were primarily tweeting about general IS and non-IS related news. The
accounts identified through semi-automated means (30 percent) had a somewhat
shorter lifespan and were tweeting content generically related to IS involvement in the
Syria conflict, including daily battle updates from several of what were then IS front-
lines, such as Mosul, Al-Bab, Deir Ez-Zor, and eastern Aleppo. Accounts located via
advanced semi-automated means (43 percent) experienced the shortest lifespans. They
were initially identified as a result of sending at least one tweet specifically disseminat-
ing “official” IS propaganda (e.g., from the Amaq News Agency). Many were thus found
to be exclusively tweeting links to official IS propaganda.
Mini-Case Study: Intervention Effectiveness
Throughout the period of data collection, IS operated a 24-hour “news cycle,” dis-
seminating a new batch of propaganda on a daily basis via Twitter and other online
platforms, using links to content hosted elsewhere on the Internet. These were prob-
ably “ghazwa” or social media “raids” orchestrated using an alternative online plat-
form, such as Telegram.21 The rapid takedown of Twitter accounts sending tweets
containing links to official IS propaganda is seen in greater detail in this case study,
which shows the effectiveness of intervention over a single 24-hour period. Figure 4
depicts survival curves for those Twitter accounts in the research database that disse-
minated links to one or more pieces of official IS propaganda produced on Monday,
3 April 201722 (based on data collected on Monday, 3 April and Tuesday, 4
April 2017).23
On Monday, 3 April 2017, IS uploaded its daily propaganda content to a variety of
social media and online content-hosting platforms. This content generally included vid-
eos (in daily news format and other propaganda videos), “picture stories” (a photo
montage that tells a story), brief pronouncements similar to short press releases, radio
podcasts, and other documents (e.g., magazines). Over the course of Monday afternoon
and evening, 153 unique Twitter accounts were identified that sent a total of 842 tweets
with links to external (non-Twitter) Web pages, each loaded with an item or items of IS
propaganda. It was found that only 10 of those Twitter accounts (7 percent) were inde-
pendent, third-party “mainstream” accounts. The balance of accounts was identified as
pro-IS. Fifty of these appeared to be throwaway accounts (i.e., accounts with no fol-
lowers set up solely to distribute propaganda and sending only IS propaganda tweets
until suspended) created on Monday evening.
Method 52 was used to track all accounts disseminating this propaganda—those send-
ing one or more tweets with a 3 April propaganda link at some point prior to 06.00
GMT on the morning of Tuesday, 4 April 2017. Figure 4 shows the survival curves for
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all 153 Twitter accounts tweeting IS propaganda from Monday, 3 April and for the sub-
set of 50 throwaway accounts specifically created on the Monday evening. The data
shows that at 07.00 GMT on Tuesday, 4 April 2017, 100 percent of these accounts were
active. However, by 13.00 GMT, this figure had reduced to just 73 percent, falling to 58
percent by 23.00 GMT. This then dropped sharply to 35 percent surviving un-sus-
pended by midnight on Tuesday. Very few of these surviving accounts were suspended
over the subsequent 48 hours tracked. The fifty throwaway accounts created on Monday
evening specifically to disseminate propaganda were suspended or deleted even faster:
by 13.00 GMT only 52 percent were still active, falling to 34 percent by 23.00 GMT and
24 percent by midnight on Tuesday.
This demonstrates that the response to official IS propaganda being distributed via
Twitter was reasonably effective in terms of identifying and taking down disseminator
accounts in the first 24 hours after they linked to official IS content. Pro-IS accounts
disseminating this official IS propaganda were taken down at a higher rate, compared
to those Pro-IS accounts not disseminating it. However, it must be borne in mind
that some Pro-IS accounts were operating on a 24-hour “news cycle” and a large
number of accounts were created daily to disseminate this propaganda. As these
accounts were being taken down during Tuesday, a similar number of fresh accounts
were being created and used to distribute the next day’s official IS content. Therefore,
it could be argued that, while efforts to remove permanent traces of IS propaganda
links from Twitter were relatively successful, pro-IS users were still able to broadcast
links to its daily propaganda using Twitter in 24-hour bursts during the
research period.
Figure 4. Case study of intervention effectiveness.
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Community Breakdown
What are the effects of this disruption on IS-supportive users and accounts? The trun-
cated survival rates for Pro-IS accounts meant that their relationship networks were
much sparser than for the Other Jihadist accounts in the dataset and compared to pre-
viously mapped IS-supporter networks on Twitter. Taking a qualitative perspective, this
means that the pro-IS Twitter community was virtually non-existent during the research
period.
To demonstrate this, Table 3 compares the median number of tweets, followers, and
friends24 of Pro-IS accounts versus those of Other Jihadists. The short lifespan of Pro-IS
accounts meant that many had only a small window in which to tweet, gain followers,
and follow other accounts. This meant Other Jihadist accounts had the opportunity to:
send six times as many tweets; follow or “friend” four times as many accounts; and
importantly, gain 13 times as many followers as the Pro-IS accounts. An even more
stark comparison is between median figures for Pro-IS accounts in 2017 versus those
recorded for similar accounts in 2014. The median number of followers for pro-IS
accounts in 2017 was 14 versus 177 in 2014,25 a decrease of 92 percent. The median
number of accounts followed by IS supporters in 2014 was 257, whereas this research
found a median of thirty-three “friends” per pro-IS account—a decrease of 87 percent.26
In an analysis of 20,000 IS supporter accounts in a five-month period between
September 2014 and January 2015, Berger and Morgan observed suspension of just 678
accounts,27 a total loss of 3.4 percent. In the research dataset outlined in this article, the
total loss of Pro-IS accounts in just four months (between January and April 2017) was
conservatively 63 percent.
Throughout what may be referred to as the IS Twitter “Golden Age” in 2013 and
2014, a variety of official IS “fighter” and an assortment of other IS “fan” accounts were
accessible with relative ease. For the uninitiated user, once one IS-related account was
located, the automated Twitter recommendations on “who to follow” accurately sup-
plied others.28 For those “in the know,” pro-IS users were easily and quickly identifiable
through their choice of carousel and avatar images, along with their user handles and
screen names. Thus, if one wished, it was quick and easy to become connected to a
large number of like-minded other Twitter users. If sufficient time and effort was
invested, it was also relatively straightforward to become a trusted—even prominent—
member of the IS “Twittersphere.”29 Not only was there a vibrant overarching pro-IS
Twitter community in existence at this time, but also a whole series of strong and sup-
portive language (e.g., Arabic, English, French, Russian, Turkish) and/or ethnicity-based
(e.g., Chechens or “al-Shishanis”) and other special interest (e.g., females or “sisters”30)
pro-IS Twitter sub-communities. Most of these special interest groups were a mix of: a
small number of users on the ground in the “caliphate”; a larger number of users want-
ing to travel to the “caliphate” (or with a stated preference to do so); and an even larger
number of “jihobbyists.”31 The latter had no formal affiliation to any jihadist group, but
Table 3. Median number of tweets, followers, and friends for accounts not yet suspended.
Tweets Followers Friends
Pro-IS 51 14 33
Other jihadist 320 189 122
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spent their time lauding fighters, celebrating suicide attackers and other “martyrs,” and
networking around and disseminating IS content.
In 2014, pro-IS accounts were already experiencing some pressure from Twitter; for
example, official IS accounts were some of the first to be suspended that summer.
Twitter’s disruption activity increased significantly over time, forcing pro-IS users to
develop and institute a host of tactics to allow them to maintain their Twitter presences,
remain active, and preserve their communities of support on the platform.32 For
example, the group employed particular hashtags, such as #baqiyyafamily (“baqiyya”
means “remain” in Arabic), to announce the return of suspended users to the platform,
in an attempt to regroup after their suspension. Twitter eventually responded by includ-
ing these hashtags in their disruption strategies. Interestingly, this increased disruption
only strengthened some IS supporters’ resolve and they became more determined to
reestablish their accounts, even after repeated suspensions. During this time, suspension
was, for some, considered to be a “badge of honor.” Thus, although disruption may
have resulted in decreased numbers of pro-IS users, it may also have contributed to the
generation of more close-knit and unified communities, as those who remained needed
a high level of commitment and virtual community support to do so.33
Eventually, however, the costs of remaining on Twitter began to outweigh the bene-
fits. Research from 2016 shows that “the depressive effects of suspension often contin-
ued even after an account returned and was not immediately re-suspended. Returning
accounts rarely reached their previous heights,”34 in terms of numbers of followers and
friends. This was probably due to the eventual discouragement of many IS supporters
subjected to rapid and repeated suspension. Even those who persisted were forced to
take countermeasures such as locking their accounts so they were no longer publicly
accessible, or diluting the content of their tweets so their commitment to IS was no lon-
ger so readily apparent. By April 2017, these measures had taken such hold that the
vast majority of Pro-IS account avatar images were default “eggs” or other innocuous
images, and many of the account user handles and screen names were meaningless
combinations of letters and numbers (see Table 4).35 A conscious, supportive, and influ-
ential virtual community is almost impossible to maintain in the face of loss of access
to such group or ideological symbols and the resultant breakdown in commitment. As a
result, IS supporters have re-located their online community-building activity elsewhere,
primarily to Telegram, which is no longer merely a back-up for Twitter.36
From a quantitative perspective, the data discussed in this section demonstrate three
key findings. First, IS and their supporters were being significantly disrupted by Twitter,
where the rate of disruption depended on the content of tweets and out-links. Second,
although all accounts experienced some type of suspension over a period of time, Pro-
IS accounts experienced this at a much higher rate compared to the Other Jihadist
Table 4. Changes in account name types due to disruption activity.
Typical user handles 2014–2015 Typical user handles 2017
Mujahid1985 4iM7EjZphT3OXYG
BintSham 5Asdf68
ukhtialalmani Omar_08
Khilafah78 t7dYqgYMaSB4EcI
ShamGreenbird GilUllul
Note. These are not “real” account screen names but composite examples constructed for illustration purposes.
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accounts in the dataset. Third, this severely affected IS’s ability to develop and maintain
robust and influential communities on Twitter. As a result, pro-IS Twitter activity has
largely been reduced to tactical use of throwaway accounts for distributing links to pro-
IS content on other platforms, rather than as a space for public IS support and influenc-
ing activity.
Beyond Twitter: The Wider Jihadi Online Ecology
Research on the intersections of violent extremism and terrorism and the Internet have,
for some time, been largely concerned with social media. Studies have often had a sin-
gular focus on Twitter due to its particular affordances (e.g., ease of data collection due
to its publicness, the nature of its application programming interface), which is prob-
lematic.37 For example, Europol’s Internet Referral Unit reported that, as far back as
mid-2016, they had identified “70 platforms used by terrorist groups to spread their
propaganda materials.”38 This section of the article is therefore concerned with the
wider online ecology where IS supporters and other non-IS jihadist users operate, with
a particular focus on out-links from Twitter.
Owing partly to its character limit,39 Twitter can function as a “gateway”40 platform
to other social networking sites and a diversity of other online spaces. In 2014, it was
estimated that one in every 2.5 pro-IS tweets contained a Uniform Resource Locator
(URL). It was acknowledged at the time that it would be useful to analyze these links,
but this was not undertaken due to complications around Twitter’s URL-shortening
practices.41 The roll-out of auto-expanding link previews by Twitter in July 2015 rem-
edied this difficulty. In terms of link activity in the data collected for this research, most
links were not out-links, but rather in-links (i.e., within Twitter): 8,086 or 14 percent
for Pro-IS and 4,650 or 7.5 percent for Other Jihadist tweets. Of the Pro-IS and Other
Jihadist Twitter accounts identified, one in eight (around 13 percent) contained non-
Twitter URLs or out-links. This is a considerable reduction from the 40 percent of
tweets reportedly containing URLs in 2014. Analysis of Twitter out-links nonetheless
provides an interesting snapshot of the Top 10 platforms linked to by Pro-IS and Other
Jihadist accounts during our data-collection period (see Table 5).
YouTube was the top linked-to platform for both Pro-IS and Other Jihadist accounts,
pointing to the overall importance of the site—and of video generally in Web 2.0—in
the jihadist online scene. Facebook does not appear in the Top 10 out-links for Pro-IS
accounts, albeit a recent report claims that IS content and IS-supportive users are still
easily locatable on Facebook.42 What our findings indicate is that, like Twitter,
Facebook is engaged in differential disruption as it is the second most preferred plat-
form for out-linking by Other Jihadists. The somewhat obscure justpaste.it content
upload site has been known for some time as a core node in the “jihadisphere,”43 and
its high-ranking status for both Pro-IS and Other Jihadist accounts is thus relatively
unsurprising.
Other content upload destinations preferred by Pro-IS users, including Google Drive,
Sendvid, Google Photos, and the Web Archive, do not appear in the Other Jihadist Top
10. One particular reason for this is probably the focus of Other Jihadists on linking to
traditional proprietary websites, such as the Taliban’s suite of sites. It is worth
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mentioning that, while Telegram slips into the Top 10 for Other Jihadists, only twenty
(0.04 percent) of all tweets from Pro-IS accounts contained a telegram.me link. The
paucity of such links caused us to explore further; we were surprised to find that just
two of 722 Pro-IS users’ biographies and two of 451 Other Jihadist users’ biographies
contained Telegram links. Neither group of accounts were using Twitter to advertise
ways into Telegram.
Case Study: Destinations of Official IS Propaganda
As mentioned, during the research period, IS was operating a 24-hour “news cycle,” dis-
seminating a daily batch of new official propaganda via social media channels, including
Twitter. Links to this propaganda were circulated through tweets and other means.
These links pointed to a wide variety of other social media and content hosts that con-
tained newly uploaded propaganda daily. A sample of these propaganda destinations
were analyzed at three time points: 4–8 February, 4–8 March (excluding 7 March, see
below), and 4–8 April 2017. The research team obtained the full daily roster of IS
propaganda and the sites where it appeared for each of these time periods. This allowed
the identification of the most frequently linked-to platforms, along with how many
pieces of propaganda were posted by host domains, and what proportion of these URLs
were subsequently taken down (see Figure 5).
Overall, over these three time periods, Pro-IS users linked to thirty-nine different
third-party platforms or sites, as well as IS running its own server44 to host its propa-
ganda material. It is important to note that the former were exclusively, it is believed,
“leaf” destinations. That is, they contained content but no links to other sites, so did
not have a networking or community-building aspect. Someone visiting such a page
would not be able to discover more about the network of other sites. Important excep-
tions to this were YouTube and a small number of other sites that algorithmically
Table 5. Top 10 other platforms (based on out-links from Twitter).
Pro-IS Other jihadist
Platform Number
Percent of all Pro-
IS tweets Platform Number
Percent of all Other
jihadist tweets
1. YouTube 1,330 2.3 1. YouTube 2,488 4.0
2. Google Drive 792 1.4 2. Facebook 1,294 2.1
3. justpaste.it 472 0.82 3. justpaste.it 479 0.77
4. Google Photos 431 0.75 4. Islamic prayers
website
316 0.51
5. sendvid.com 410 0.71 5. Taliban news
website
244 0.39
6. archive.org 353 0.61 6. Official Taliban
website
228 0.37
7. archive.is 243 0.42 7. Taliban’s official
Urdu language
website
208 0.33
8. “Unofficial”
Bahasa language
IS fan site
198 0.34 8. Hizb ut-Tahrir
website
189 0.30
9. medium.com 155 0.27 9. Telegram 111 0.18
10. “Unofficial”
Arabic language
IS news site
139 0.24 10. Taliban’s official
English language
website
103 0.17
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“recommend” similar content in their inventory, which may have resulted in their
pointing to other available IS propaganda.45 During the period of the research, the aver-
age number of URLs populated rose from forty-two per day in February to fifty-two
per day in April. This hints at increasing fragmentation and dispersal, possibly in
response to takedown activity by a variety of platforms and sites. However, there was a
large inter-day variation (twenty to sixty-five) and one outlier day on 7 March was
excluded, as it was the publication date of issue 7 of IS’s Rumiyah online magazine. On
this day, IS pushed 240 separate URLs, a quarter of which contained direct reference to
Rumiyah in the link, and many more that probably linked to the new issue of
the magazine.46
Of the forty domains used (thirty-nine external, one internal server), a consistent “big
6” became apparent across the three time periods: justpaste.it; IS’s own server; archi-
ve.org; sendvid.com; YouTube; and Google Drive. These six domains accounted for 83
percent, 70 percent, and 67 percent of the URLs in the February, March, and April sam-
pling periods, respectively. However, there was a noticeable declining trend in the use
of justpaste.it and IS’s own servers. Between them, this accounted for 40 percent of
URLs in February declining to only 18 percent by April. At around that time the Amaq
News Agency website had come under repeated attack, which may have been
Figure 5. Destinations of official IS propaganda: Number of URLs and URL destinations February to
April 2017.
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responsible for its relative downgrading.47 Use of sendvid.com and archive.org varied
across the time periods, while Google Drive and YouTube were consistently heavily
used. In fact, YouTube use showed an increasing trend (7 percent, 11 percent, and 12
percent, respectively). The remaining URLs (17 percent in February rising to 33 percent
of URLs by April) were spread across a wide variety of mainly, although not exclusively,
content upload sites (thirty-four in total).
The proportion of IS propaganda successfully taken down was also analyzed. The
takedown rate (as of 12 April, 2017) was 72 percent, 66 percent, and 72 percent for the
February, March, and April samples, respectively. Overall, 30 percent of links were still
live on 12 April. This suggests that takedown activity was relatively rapid (occurring
over a matter of days after propaganda was posted) and widespread (across a multipli-
city of sites and platforms).
Conclusion
The costs for most pro-IS users of engaging on Twitter (in terms of deflated morale,
diffused messages and persistent effort needed to maintain a public presence) now
largely outweigh the benefits. This means that the IS Twitter community is now almost
non-existent. In turn, this means that radicalization, recruitment, and attack planning
opportunities on this platform have probably also decreased. However, a hard core of
users remain persistent. In particular, a subset of established throwaway disseminator
accounts pushed out “official” IS content in a daily cycle during our data-collection
period and continue to do so. These accounts were generally suspended within 24 hours,
but not before they promoted links to content hosted on other platforms.
This article was mainly concerned with pro-IS Twitter accounts and their disruption.
However, IS are not the only jihadists active on Twitter, and a host of other violent
jihadists were shown to be subject to much lower levels of disruption by Twitter. Also,
IS and other jihadist groups remain active on a wide range of other social media plat-
forms, content hosting sites and other cyberspaces, including blogs, forums, and dedi-
cated websites. While it appears that official IS content is being disrupted in many of
these online spaces, the extent is yet to be fully determined.
The Telegram messaging application was mentioned a number of times in this article
and is worth treating here in slightly more depth as it is IS supporters’ currently most
preferred platform. Telegram is as yet a lower profile platform than Twitter—and obvi-
ously also Facebook—with a smaller user base and higher barriers to entry (e.g., provi-
sion of a mobile phone number to create an account, time-limited invitations to join
channels48). These are probably positive attributes from the perspective of cutting down
on the numbers of users exposed to IS’s online content and thereby in a position to be
violently radicalized by it. On the negative side, this may mean that Telegram’s pro-IS
community is more committed than its Twitter variant. Also, while IS’s reach via
Telegram is less than it was via Twitter, the echo chamber effect may be greater as the
“owners” of Telegram channels and groups have much greater control over who joins
and contributes to these than on Twitter. Another aspect of Telegram that’s doubtless
also attractive to pro-IS users is its in-platform content upload and cloud storage
STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 15
function(s). While Telegram restricts users from uploading files larger than 1.5GB—
roughly a two-hour movie—it provides seemingly unlimited amounts of storage.
In terms of proactive steps taken by Telegram with respect to IS and their supporters’
use of their service, in December 2016, Telegram established a dedicated “ISIS Watch”
channel, which provides a running tally of numbers of “ISIS bots and channels banned”
by them. On 11 March, 2017 a message on the channel stated “Our abuse team actively
bans ISIS content on Telegram. Following your reports, an average of 70 ISIS channels
are terminated each day before they reach any traction.” Between January and May
2018, the average number of terminations per days had jumped sixfold to 422. All told,
Telegram claims to have banned 106,573 “ISIS bots and channels” in the period
December 2016 to 31 May 2018, with May 2018 (9,810) having the highest number of
bans yet recorded.49 While it is clear therefore that Telegram routinely bans pro-IS
users, channels, and bots, interpreting the numbers that Telegram has supplied is diffi-
cult absent knowing the overall numbers of users, channels, and bots actually active on
the platform at any given time. Also worth pointing out is that in addition to exploiting
the channels feature, IS began taking advantage of Telegram’s groups function around
summer 2017. So-called Supergroups allow for intra-group communication among up
to 30,000 members50 and like all other group chats on Telegram are private among par-
ticipants; Telegram does not, in other words, process requests, including termination
requests, related to them.51
Recommendations
The recommendations arising from this analysis are threefold. First, modern social
media monitoring systems have the ability to dramatically increase the speed and effect-
iveness of data gathering, analysis, and (potentially) intervention. To work effectively,
however, they must deploy a combination of suitable technology solutions, including
analytical systems, with trained human analysts who are versed in the relevant
domain(s) and preferably also the appropriate languages. This is particularly the case
where an adversary is actively trying to evade tracking efforts. Technology such as
Method52 assists by allowing the analyst to rapidly develop new analytical pipelines that
take into account day-to-day changes in modes of operation. However, technology can-
not detect such changes; these can generally only be spotted by a human well-versed in
the particular domain of interest.
Second, some IS supporters remain active on Twitter. Content disseminators using
throwaway accounts could probably be degraded further—although this may have both
pros (e.g., detrimental impact on last remaining significant IS supporter Twitter activity)
and cons (e.g., further degradation of Twitter as a source of data or open source intelli-
gence on IS). Like all disruption activity, whether this is viewed positively or negatively
depends on one’s perspective and institutional interests. For example, law enforcement
tends to favor this approach, whereas free-speech advocates warn against corporate
policing of political speech, even if that speech is deeply objectionable. Some intelligence
professionals, on the other hand, advocate for greater attention to social media
intelligence.52
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Third, the focus of this article has not just been Twitter, but the importance of
the wider jihadist online ecology was also pointed to. The analysis was also not
restricted to IS users and content; the presence and often uninterrupted online
activity of non-IS jihadists was underlined too. In recent years, many counterterrorism
professionals tasked with examining the role of the Internet in violent extremism
and terrorism have narrowed their focus to IS. Scholarly researchers have acted simi-
larly, many narrowing their focus further to IS Twitter activity. Continued analytical
contraction of this sort should be guarded against. Maintenance of a wide-angle view of
online activity by diverse other jihadists across a variety of social media and other
online platforms is recommended. This is particularly important due to the shifting for-
tunes of IS and HTS on the ground in Iraq and Syria. In the face of increasing loss of
physical territory, the continued—and potentially increasing— importance of online
“territory” should not be underestimated. It is not that a focus on IS should be dis-
pensed with, but the significantly less-impeded online activity of HTS is surely an
important asset for them and worth monitoring. Because data collection and analysis of
other terrorist groups and their online platforms has been neglected, very few historical
metrics are available for comparative analyses; this should be guarded against in
future too.
Future research
Finally, some comments as regards future research. Our Other Jihadist category was a
convenience sample of non-IS jihadist accounts. It is therefore proposed to replicate the
present research, but with a larger and more equal sample of HTS, Ahrar al-Sham, and
Taliban accounts. This would allow for a more systematic and comparative analysis of
the disruption levels for a range of non-IS jihadists, including those with a significant
international terrorism footprint (i.e., HTS), groups with a significant national and
regional terrorism profile (i.e., Taliban), and a party to the Syria conflict (i.e., Ahrar al-
Sham).53 Such an analysis could help to ascertain the vibrancy of their contemporary
Twitter communities and Twitter out-linking practices, and allow their preferred other
online platforms to be identified.
Additional research is also clearly warranted into the wider violent jihadist online
ecology. Wider and more in-depth research into the following is therefore
recommended:
1. patterns of use, including community-building and influencing activity;
2. levels of disruption on other platforms besides Twitter, including other major
platforms such as YouTube, but also other smaller or more obscure platforms,
such as justpaste.it and others.
Analysis of pro-IS and other violent jihadist activity on Telegram and comparing this
with our present findings is suggested too. It would also be worthwhile analyzing out-
linking trends on Telegram to determine how the functionalities of different platforms
have an impact on linking practices.
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